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Severing Venue and Personal
Jurisdiction In Missouri
State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert'
I. INTRODUCTION
The concepts of venue and jurisdiction carry independent and severable
meanings. "Venue" means the place where a case is to be tried,2 while
"jurisdiction" speaks to the power of the court to hear and determine a case
In Missouri, a "unique melding"4 of the concepts developed. A line of cases
commingling venue and personal jurisdiction yielded strange and often unduly
harsh results.' In State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert,6 the
Missouri Supreme Court attempted to sever venue and jurisdiction,7 and
finally restore some common sense and predictability to sixty plus years of
confusion.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A medical malpractice suit filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis named DePaul Health Center ("DePaul") as a codefendant.8 The cause
of action accrued in St. Louis County and all named defendants, including
1. 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
2. Oney v. Pattison, 747 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Mo. 1988), overruled by State ex rel.
DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
3. Oney, 747 1.W.2d at 140.
4. Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co., 646 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Mo. 1983),
overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.
1994).
5. See, e.g., the line of cases overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v.
Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994): Yatesv. Casteel, 49 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1932);
Hankins v. Smarr, 137 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1940); State ex rel. Minihanv. Aronson, 165
S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1942); State exrel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951);
State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 238 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1951); State ex rel. Boll v.
Weinstein, 295 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1956); Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co., 646
S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1983); State ex reL Wasson v. Schroeder, 646 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.
1983); State ex reL Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Gaertner, 681 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1984);
Oney v. Pattison, 747 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1988).
6. 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
7. Id. at 821,
8. Id. The other codefendants were Dr. Joseph Hazen and Group Health Plan.
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DePaul, resided in St. Louis County.' The city court issued service of
summons on all of the defendants in the county."0 Subsequently, DePaul
entered a special appearance" in the city court and moved to quash the
service.' 2
DePaul contended that, under Missouri Revised Statutes section
508.010,3 venue was improper in the malpractice action. 4 After noting
that filing within a proper venue is a prerequisite to valid service of process
in Missouri, 5 DePaul argued the city court should quash the service.16
Plaintiffs in the underlying action argued that venue was in fact proper, so the
city court could not quash the service of summons.1" The trial court
overruled DePaul's motion, and DePaul brought a mandamus action to the
Missouri Supreme Court."
The Missouri Supreme Court, although finding venue to be improper,
refused to quash the service, holding that a valid summons may issue from a
court in which venue is improper. 9
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. "A special appearance is for the purpose of testing or objecting to the
sufficiency of service or the jurisdiction of the court over defendant without submitting
to such jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 97 (6th ed. 1990).
12. DePaul, 820 S.W.2d at 821.
13. "When there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties, the
suit may be brought in any such county." Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.010(2) (1994).
14. DePaul, 820 S.W.2d at 821. DePaul argued that since all of the defendants
resided in St. Louis County, under Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.010(2), supra note 13, the
plaintiff could not bring suit in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis. DePaul, 820
S.W.2d at 821.
15. DePaul, 820 S.W.2d at 821. Cases preceding DePaul clearly held that filing
in the proper venue is a prerequisite to valid service of process. See, e.g., Oney, 747
S.W.2d at 141.
16. DePaul, 820 S.W.2d at 821.
17. Id. The plaintiffs argued that Group Health Plan, one of the defendants,
transacted business in the city of St. Louis; therefore, venue was proper in the city
court under Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.010(2), supra note 13. DePaul, 820 S.W.2d at
821.
18. DePaul, 820 S.W.2d at 821.
19. Id. at 822. As a corollary issue, the court also held that "venue is determined
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Missouri courts derived the unique jurisdictional venue rule from a
collusive reading of the Missouri service of summons and venue statutes.20
Before 1989, the service statute read, in part, that "[s]uits may be instituted in
courts of record . . . [b]y filing in the office of the clerk of the proper
court."21 The Missouri general venue statute prescribed where parties could
bring suits instituted by summons.2 2 When read together, courts interpreted
"proper" in the service statute to mean proper venue, pursuant to Missouri
Revised Statutes section 508.010.' Such an interpretation links venue with
personal jurisdiction in the following manner:
Personal jurisdiction, which follows from proper service of process on a
defendant, is therefore dependent upon the court whichissues the summons
having authority to do so, ab initio, under the statute. A summons served
on a defendant as the result of an action filed in a court in which venue is
improper provides no jurisdiction over the defendant, because the court has
no authority under the statute to issue the summons.24
En route to making the above analysis the court in Oney v. Pattison did
not precisely trace the development of the unique Missouri rule through
Missouri's case law. In fact, the Oney analysis demonstrates only a partial
connection with the case that truly catalyzed the link between jurisdiction and
venue.26  This strange quirk in the law can be traced back to Yates v.
Casteel.2 In Yates, the plaintiff filed a breach of contract action in Jasper
County, where the defendant resided.2' The clerk of the Circuit Court of
20. Oney v. Pattison, 747 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Mo. 1988), overruledby State ex rel.
DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994). Another less
meritorious theory concerning the origin of this rule contends that the jurisdictional
venue rule stems from cases in the late 1800's which misanalyzed the separate and
distinct roles of venue and personaljurisdiction. See Dennis J. Tuchler, Discretionary
InterlocutoryReview in Missouri: Judicial Abuse of the Writ? 40 Mo. L. REv. 577,
599-605 (1975) (citing Lindell Real Estate Co. v. Lindell, 133 Mo. 386 (1895)).
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 506.110 (1986) (emphasis added).
22. See Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 508.010 (1994).
23. See Oney, 747 S.W.2d at 141, for a thorough explanation of the word
"proper" in the Missouri service of summons statute.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 140.
26. See Yates v. Casteel, 49 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1932), overruled by State ex rel.
DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 69-70.
3
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Jasper County issued a summons directed to "the sheriff of any county." '29
Subsequently, the sheriff of the City of St. Louis found and served the
defendant in the City of St. Louis.3" The defendant moved to quash the
service of summons, arguing that the Circuit Court of Jasper County had no
authority to issue a summons directed to the sheriff of any county outside of
Jasper County.3
The Yates court determined that Jasper County was, in fact, the proper
venue, 2 but quashed the service of summons.3 The court held that without
statutory authorization, the appropriate court of venue had no power to issue
or serve the summons outside the county of venue. 4 Thus, the Yates court
fused venue and service of summons in two ways: (1) it implicitly made
filing within the proper venue a condition precedent to valid service of
summons (the Yates filing requirement); and (2) it explicitlymade the issuance
and actual service of process within the county of venue a condition precedent
to valid service of summons (the Yates service requirement).3 5
Two subsequent Missouri Supreme Court cases correctly applied Yates'
second rule of law. In State ex rel. Minihan v. Aronson," the plaintiff filed
suit in the proper venue but served the defendant outside of that venue. 7
Following Yates, the Minihan court quashed the service, holding that "'in
personam is confined to persons within the territorialjurisdiction of the court'
and 'it follows that service of process made beyond such limits is entirely
ineffective to confer jurisdiction over the persons . . . on whom it is so
made.' "
29. Id. at 69.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 70. In the case of a sole defendant residing in Missouri, venue is proper
"in the county within which the defendant resides." Mo. REV. STAT. § 508.010(1)
(1994). Venue was appropriate in Yates because the sole defendant resided in Jasper
County. Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 70.
33. Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 71.
34. Id. at 70-71. Yates read venue and service statutes together and determined
they "must be held to contemplate and require the issuance of summons to, and service
thereof in, Jasper county." Id. at 70.
35. See id. Yates did recognize that the legislature can satisfy the service
requirement via a statutory allowance of service beyond the county of venue. Id.
36. 165 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1942), overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr.
v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
37. Id. at 406.
38. Id. at 407 (citing Hankins v. Smarr, 137 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1940) overruled
by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994)); Yates,
49 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1932)). After applying the Yates' service requirement, the
Minihan court stated: "This is not an immutable rule, however, but any change in the
[Vol. 60
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In Hankins v. Smarr,9 the Missouri Supreme Court correctly applied,
but smudged the Yates principles in its analysis. In Hankins, the plaintiff, a
resident of Boone County, filed suit in Boone County against two defendants,
both residents of Gasconade County.4" By statute, venue in such an action
can be proper in the plaintiff's county of residence if "the defendant may be
found" in that county.41 However, the plaintiff in Hankins did not "find" the
defendants in Boone County, but found and served them in Gasconade
County.4
2
The court quashed the service pursuant to Yates,43 but its analysis did
not distinguish the two distinct prerequisites to valid service of summons
instituted by Yates.44  The Hankins court pointed out the impropriety of
venue in Boone County at the time of service in applying Yates, 4 but also
professed that even if venue in Boone County were proper, it would quash the
service because the plaintiff actually served the defendants outside of Boone
County.46 Despite the court's clear intention to base its decision on the Yates
service requirement,47 a cursory reading of Hankins elevates the implied
filing requirement of Yates and downplays the service requirement.48
In State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown,49 the Missouri Supreme Court
rendered an unexplained decision regarding the fusion of venue and personal
jurisdiction. The plaintiff in O'Keefe filed a personal injury action in an
improper venue.5" Without citing supporting authority, the Missouri
Supreme Court stated matter-of-factly that because the plaintiff filed in an
improper venue, the court failed to gain personal jurisdiction over the
rule depends upon valid legislative action." Id.
39. 137 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1940).
40. Id. at 500.
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.010(1) (1994).
42. Hankins, 137 S.W.2d at 500.
43. Id. at 501.
44. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45. Hankins, 137 S.W.2d at 501. The defendants were not "found" in Boone
County at the time of service of process, as required by Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.010(1)
(1994).
46. Hankins, 137 S.W.2d at 501.
47. See id. In fact, Hankins discussed the cruelty of a rule that precludes service
of process outside of the county of venue, in that defendants could dodge personal
jurisdiction by staying out of the county of venue. See id.
48. See id.
49. 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951), overruled by State ex rel DePaul Health Ctr.
v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
50. Id. at 307.
5
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defendant.51 Whether the O'Keefe court derived its ruling from an
interpretation of Hankins2 or applied the filing requirement of Yates, 3 one
point is for certain: O 'Keefe squarely represents the proposition that filing in
a proper venue is a condition precedent to personal jurisdiction. 4
After O 'Keefe, the venue-personaljurisdiction cases focused solely on the
filing requirement of Yates,55  and blindly abandoned the service
requirement. 6  Just weeks after O'Keefe, the Missouri Supreme Court
decided State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen." Bartlett cemented the rule that
filing in the proper venue is a prerequisite to personaljurisdiction. In Bartlett,
the plaintiff, a resident of Jackson County, filed suit in Jackson County against
two defendants, both residents of Platte County. 8 The plaintiff served one
defendant in Jackson County and the other in Platte County.59 The
defendants moved to quash the service, arguing that venue was improper in
Jackson County, and, therefore, the Jackson County Court could not gain
personal jurisdiction." The court held that, by statute, venue was proper for
an action against the defendant served in Jackson County, so the court
obtained personal jurisdiction over that defendant upon the service of
summons in Jackson County.6 However, the court concurrently held venue
was improper as to the defendant served in Platte County.62 Therefore,
under Yates and O'Keefe, the service of summons was invalid because a
prerequisite to valid service, serving in the proper venue, was not satisfied.63
Interestingly, Bartlett justified its decision by citing Yates and
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
54. O 'Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 307. Again, this ruling contains no references to
Yates or its progeny. In fact, the sole analysis in O'Keefepertains to the propriety of
venue. See id.
55. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
57. 238 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1951), overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr.
v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
58. Id. at 394.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 395. The court statedthat pursuant to § 508.010(1), this defendant was
"found" in the county of venue when served in Jackson County; therefore, venue was
proper as to this defendant. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Yates,49 S.W.2dat70;Hankins, 137 S.W.2d at 501;Minihan, 165
S.W.2d at 407; O'Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 307).
[Vol. 60
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O'Keefe.64 The genesis of the rule applied in Bartlett" definitely can be
traced to the forceful, but unsupported O 'Keefe decision.66 Yates, though,
dealt only impliedly with how the impropriety of venue relates to jurisdiction,
but dealt explicitly with territorial boundaries of courts of proper venue.67
For years after Bartlett, Missouri courts mechanically applied the rule that
filing in the proper venue acts as a condition precedent to valid service of
summons and ultimately personal jurisdiction." Finally, in 1988, the
Missouri Supreme Court questioned the rule in Oney v. Pattison.9
In Oney, the plaintiff filed suit in the east side of Jackson County instead
of the west side' ° where venue was proper.71 The court rigidly opined that
because "Oney filed her action in the improper venue; the service accepted by
Pattison issued from a court which had no authority to issue such summons,"
and therefore, the lower court failed to gain personal jurisdiction." Oney,
however, recognized the harshness in deciding that this action could not be
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See O 'Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 307.
67. See Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 70. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see
supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., several cases overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr v.
Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994): Boll v. Weinstein, 295 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo.
1956) (holding that "proper venue is necessary, before the service of process will
confer jurisdiction over the person of a defendant," and that due to its jurisdictional
nature, improper venue can only be waived by "some overt act constituting a general
appearance."); Sullenger, 646 S.W.2d at 88 ("Missouri case law has provided a unique
melding of venue and jurisdiction and by a long line of cases has held that proper
venue is a condition precedent to valid service of process and jurisdiction."); Wasson
v. Schroeder, 646 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Mo. 1983) ("[i]rmproper venue is a fundamental
defect; a court which acts when venue is not proper has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction."); State ex rel. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Gaertner, 681 S.W.2d 445, 448
(Mo. 1984) ('[b]ecause venue was improper, the court acquired no jurisdiction over
relator and was powerless to proceed.").
69. 747 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1988), overruledby State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr.
v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
70. Jackson County is divided into eastern and western portions for venue
purposes. Mo. REV. STAT. § 478.461 (1994).
71. Oney, 747 S.W.2d at 138.
72. Id. at 141.
7
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transferred from one side of Jackson County to the other,73 and tried to make
sense of the rule it applied.
Oney attempted to excavate the foundation of the rule it applied in
Missouri case law74 but failed to accurately unearth its roots;75 however,
Oney did provide a logical statutory construction argument supporting its
ruling. 6 Oney reasoned since the Missouri service statute required the
commencement of a lawsuit in the "proper" court, the Missouri legislature
necessarily intended that filing in a proper venue act as a condition precedent
to valid service of summons and consequently, personal jurisdiction." Oney
then issued a challenge to the legislature to statutorily remedy this nonsensical
rule.7
9
The legislature responded. Shortly after Oney, the legislature enacted a
statute permitting the transfer of cases within the two sections of Jackson
County if the parties so agreed, or if a caseload imbalance necessitated such
transfers.8" State ex rel. Edu-Dyne Systems, Inc. v. Trout"1 held the new
statute severed the venue-jurisdiction link within Jackson County.' Thus,
73. Id. Oney stated that the "requirement that actions be dismissed for improper
venue may be unduly harsh, may result-as in this case-in injustice, and may create
unnecessary impediments to the expeditious and orderly resolution of controversies on
the merits." Id.
74. Id. at 140-41.
75. Oney traced the rule back to Yates v. Casteel, 49 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1932),
overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.
1994). The Yates court specifically held that the appropriate court of venue had no
power to issue or serve the summons outside of the county of venue. Nowhere in the
Yates opinion did the supreme court explicitly state that filing in the proper venue is
a prerequisite to valid service of summons. See Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 70. The Oney
court's analysis simply is not as clear cut as it appears at first glance.
76. See Oney, 747 S.W.2d at 141.
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 506.110 (Supp. 1989).
78. See Oney, 747 S.W.2d at 141. For a more detailed analysis of this issue see
supranotes 20-24 and accompanying text.
79. Oney, 747 S.W.2d at 141 ("Until such time as the legislature chooses to alter
the language of Section 506.110, the ability of trial courts to transfer actions filed in
the wrong venue to a proper venue in the interest of justice cannot be judicially
imposed.").
80. Mo. REv. STAT. § 478.461.2(4) (Supp. 1989).
81. 781 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1989), overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v.
Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
82. Id. at 86 ("The General Assembly is presumed familiar with the construction
placed upon the original act, and the new statute must be construed in the light of the
problem it seeks to remedy and of the usages, circumstances, and conditions existing
at the time the change was made.... Thus, in enacting a new statute on the same
[Vol. 60
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the legislature dealt the first significant blow to the rule. In 1989, the
legislature unabashedly hammered the rule again. The legislature dropped the
word "proper" from the service statute' and affirmatively authorized the
transfer of cases filed in an improper venue to a proper venue.' Both the
Southern District and Eastem District opined the 1989 statutory amendments
and additions did away with the "unique melding"' of jurisdiction and venue
in Missouri.86
The filing requirement articulated in Yates seemed destroyed almost
immediately after the statutory changes of 1989, but the Missouri Supreme
Court had not delivered its stamp of finality on the issue. The supreme court,
in an action in mandamus, grappled with that very issue in State ex rel.
DePaul Health Center v. MummertY
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In DePaul, the Missouri Supreme Court placed great emphasis in its
analysis of the fusion of venue and jurisdiction on Oney v. Pattisona and the
ordinary meanings of venue and jurisdiction. 9 The general purpose of
venue, the court stated, "is to provide a convenient, logical, and orderly forum
for the resolution of disputes,"9 whereas personal jurisdiction simply cloaks
a court with the authority to judge a defendant.91
subject as that of an existing statute, it is ordinarily the intent of the legislature to
effect some change in the existing law.").
83. Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.110 (Supp. 1989).
84. Mo. REv. STAT. § 476.410 (Supp. 1989).
85. Sullenger, 646 S.W.2d at 88.
86. See, e.g., Abney v. Niswonger, 823 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991),
overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.
1994) ("This statute was enacted to enable a circuit court to transfer an improperly
venued action and reflects a clear legislative intent that cases are not to be dismissed
when filed in the wrong county."); State ex reL Missouri Highway and Transp.
Comm'n v. Hedspeth, 788 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), overruled by State
ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) ("It thus appears
that the General Assembly undertook to accept Oney's invitation to enact legislation
enabling a circuit court to transfer an action in which venue is improper to a circuit
court where the action could have properly been brought.").
87. 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
88. 747 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1988), overruledby State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr.
v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994).
89. See DePaul, 870 S.W.2d at 821-22.
90. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. 1993)).
91. Id. at 822.
9
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While relying on Oney, the DePaul court attempted to pinpoint the source
of the concepts' fusion in Missouri. The court reasoned that the word
"proper" in the old Missouri service statute' meant that "[a] summons served
on a defendant as the result of an action filed in a court in which venue is
improper provides no jurisdiction over the defendant."'  But, the legislature
in 1989 dropped "proper" from the Missouri service statute,94 and authorized
courts to transfer actions filed in an improper venue to a circuit court having
proper venue.95
After untangling the concepts of venue and jurisdiction the court briefly
summarized its position:
Venue and personal jurisdiction address entirely different concerns, the
coupling of which was the product of the use of the word "proper" in
Section 506.110.1. Byremoving "proper" from Section 506.110.1(1), the
legislature severed the two concepts. 96
The DePaul court held that valid service of summons can issue from a
court of improper venue. Filing in a proper venue, therefore, no longer is a
condition precedent to personal jurisdiction.' "To the extent they hold
otherwise,"" DePaul overruled a long line of cases.99
V. COMMENT
The Missouri Supreme Court clearlybelieved the legislature, via the 1989
statutory changes and amendments 1" intended to completely sever all
92. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 506.110.1(1) (1994).
93. DePaul, 870 S.W.2d at 821 (citing Oney, 747 S.W.2d at 141). For a more
thorough explication of Oney, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
94. DePaul, 820 S.W.2d at 821 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 506.110.1(1) (Supp.
1989)).




99. The line of cases overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert,
870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) includes: Oneyv. Pattison, 747 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1988);
State ex reL Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Gaertner, 681 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1984);
Sullenger v. Cooke Sales &" Serv. Co., 646 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1983); State ex rel.
Wassonv. Schroeder, 646 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. 1983); State exrel. Bartlettv. Queen, 238
S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1951); State exrel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951);
State ex rel. Minihanv. Aronson, 165 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1942); Hankins v. Smarr, 137
S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1940); Yates v. Casteel, 49 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1932).
100. See Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 476.410, 506.110 (Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 60
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connections between venue and personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, it
attempted to carry out such legislative intent in DePaul."1  Although
DePaul provides sound law in its attempt to sever venue and personal
jurisdiction, its scope is underinclusive.
Historically, the link between venue and service of summons had a
logical nexus."°  Courts' judgments only bound those who submitted to
their judgments."° In order to ensure that a party submitted to their
judgments, courts issued writs of summons that authorized the seizure and
arrest of persons and property pending judgment.' Because of their
coercive nature, courts' authority to issue such writs was territorially
limited.
0 5
However, jurisdictional concepts evolved and the need to force a party's
submission to authority dissipated. "Today, the connection between authority
to bind by judgments and authority to arrest or seize is gone, but the formality
of service of process as a kind of symbolic arrest remains."'0 5 A summons
today "symbolically arrests" by notifying its recipient of a given court's
proceedings against her or him. °7 Gone is the logical nexus between venue
and power. Today, the concepts are independent and severable, and at long
last the DePaul court attempted to update Missouri's position regarding this
issue.108
The court, however, in its haste to forge good law failed to identify and
destroy all links between venue and personal jurisdiction. Yates v. Casteel
catalyzed the awareness of the venue-personal jurisdiction connection, and
identified not one, but two distinct links. 09 First, a party must file a lawsuit
in the proper venue for service of process to be valid. 0 Second, even if
venue is proper, for service to be valid, the defendant must actually be served
101. See DePaul, 870 S.W.2d at 822 ("By removing 'proper' from Section
506.110.1(1), the legislature severed the two concepts.").
102. See Tuchler, supra note 20, at 600.
103. Tuchler, supra note 20, at 600.
104. Tuchler, supra note 20, at 600.
105. Tuchler, supra note 20, at 600.
106. Tuchler, supra note 20, at 600.
107. Tuchler, supra note 20, at 600. See JACK H. FRIEDENTRAL ET AL., CIviL
PROCEDURE §§ 3.20-3.24 (1993), for a sweeping overview of the purposes and means
of service of process today.
108. See DePaul, 870 S.W.2d at 821.
109. See Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 69-70.
110. Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 70. This is the filing requirement of Yates. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
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within the proper venue."' Since Yates, Missouri courts allowed the service
requirement to slip into anonymity.'
Not surprisingly, in DePaul the Missouri Supreme Court ignored Yates'
service requirement when it specifically limited"' its holding that "[a]
summons can now issue from a court in which venue is not proper.""' 4 The
holding clearly obliterated the filing requirement of Yates, but does not
directly affect the service requirement. DePaul provides no explicit direction
for future validity of service conflicts that will arise when summons is validly
issued under DePaul, but is actually served in an improper venue. Under the
authority of Yates' service requirement" 5 and a host of other cases sneaking
the long lost service requirement into Missouri courts," 6 such a connection
would render service of process invalid.
Surely the supreme court did not intend to leave behind a single
connection between venue and personal jurisdiction if "the legislature severed
the two concepts.""' 7 Such a result would clash with the spirit of DePauL
Perhaps the DePaul court indirectly and unintentionally overruled the service
requirement articulated by Yates.
The DePaul court explicitly held a valid summons can issue from a court
without proper venue. In making its ruling, the court necessarily recognized
that a summons issued from an improper venue frequently would be served
within that improper venue."' In other words, the court had to assume,
contrary to the service requirement of Yates,"9 that valid service of process
would sometimes occur outside of the proper venue. Because the DePaul
111. Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 70. This is the service requirement of Yates. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., the following cases overruled by State ex rel. DePaul Health Cir.
v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994): State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 238
S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1951); State ex reL O'Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951);
State exrel. Minihanv. Aronson, 165 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1942); Hankins v. Smarr, 137
S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1940).
113. See DePaul, 870 S.W.2d at 822 ("To the extent they hold otherwise ...
114. Id.
115. See Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 70.
116. See, e.g., DeMarinis v. Smith, 449 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969);
State ex rel. MercantileNat'l Bankv. Rooney, 402 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo. 1966); State
exrel. Public Serv. Comm'nv. Thompson, 379 S.W.2d 824,826 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964);
State ex rel. Kissingerv. Allison, 328 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Aronson,
165 S.W.2d at 407; Hankins, 137 S.W.2d at 501.
117. DePaul, 870 S.W.2d at 822.
118. After all, why would a court issue a summons without intending that it be
served?
119. See Yates, 49 S.W.2d at 70. For a more concise explanation of both
requirements in Yates, see supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
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court intended to completely sever venue and jurisdiction, actual service of a
defendant in a county other than the county of venue should not render the
issuing court completely powerless.
Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court might have haphazardly accomplished
its desired goal: the destruction of all territorial limitations venue placed upon
personal jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert, the Missouri Supreme
Court attempted to completely sever venue and personal jurisdiction in holding
that valid service of process can issue from an improper venue. Due to the
underinclusive scope of the opinion, however, future litigation regarding the
validity of a summons actually served outside of the proper venue likely will
occur. In substance, the court rendered a wise and long overdue opinion.
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